SEC Charges Former Countrywide Financial Executives With Securities Fraud

Former CEO Angelo Mozilo Additionally Charged With Insider Trading

Washington, D.C., June 4, 2009 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged former Countrywide Financial CEO Angelo Mozilo and two other former executives with securities fraud for deliberately misleading investors about the significant credit risks being taken in efforts to build and maintain the company's market share.

Article continues below...

Mozilo was additionally charged with insider trading for selling his Countrywide stock based on non-public information for nearly $140 million in profits.

The SEC alleges that Mozilo along with former chief operating officer and president David Sambol and former chief financial officer Eric Sieracki misled the market by falsely assuring investors that Countrywide was primarily a prime quality mortgage lender that had avoided the excesses of its competitors.

Excerpts of E-Mails From Angelo Mozilo

The SEC's enforcement action alleges that from 2005 through 2007, Countrywide engaged in an unprecedented expansion of its underwriting guidelines and was writing riskier and riskier loans, which these senior executives were warned might ultimately curtail the company's ability to sell them. Countrywide was required to disclose these important trends to its investors in the Management Discussion and Analysis portion of its SEC filings, but failed to do so.

"This is the tale of two companies," said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement. "Countrywide portrayed itself as underwriting mainly prime quality mortgages using high underwriting standards. But concealed from shareholders was the true Countrywide, an increasingly reckless lender assuming greater and greater risk. Angelo Mozilo privately described one Countrywide product as 'toxic,' and said another's performance was so uncertain that Countrywide was 'flying blind.'"

Rosalind Tyson, Director of the SEC's Los Angeles Regional Office, added, "Angelo Mozilo had access to detailed and alarming information about Countrywide's operations. He knew that Countrywide was gambling with increasingly risky mortgages and he kept those details from investors while he was actively taking his own chips off the table."

According to the SEC's complaint, filed in federal district court in Los Angeles, Countrywide's annual reports for 2005, 2006, and 2007 misled investors in claiming that Countrywide "manage[d] credit risk through credit policy, underwriting, quality control and surveillance activities." Its annual reports for 2005 and 2006 falsely stated that the company ensured its "access to the secondary mortgage market by consistently producing quality mortgages." The annual report for 2006 also falsely claimed that Countrywide had "prudently underwritten" its Pay-Option ARM loans.

The SEC alleges that Mozilo, Sambol, and Sieracki actually knew, and acknowledged internally, that Countrywide was writing increasingly risky loans and that defaults and delinquencies would rise as a result, both in loans that Countrywide serviced and loans that the company packaged and sold as mortgage-backed securities.

According to the SEC's complaint, Countrywide developed what was internally referred to as a "supermarket" strategy that widened underwriting guidelines to match any product offered by its competitors. By the end of 2006, Countrywide's underwriting guidelines were as wide as they had ever been, and Countrywide made an increasing number of loans based on exceptions to those already wide guidelines, even though exception loans had a higher rate of default.

The SEC's complaint alleges that Mozilo believed that the risk was so high that he repeatedly urged that Countrywide sell its entire portfolio of Pay-Option loans. Despite these severe concerns about the increasing risks that Countrywide was undertaking, Mozilo, Sambol, and Sieracki hid these risks from the investing public.

The SEC further alleges that Mozilo engaged in insider trading of Countrywide stock that he owned. Mozilo established four executive stock sale plans for himself in October, November, and December 2006 while he was aware of material, non-public information concerning Countrywide's increasing credit risk and the expected poor performance of Countrywide-originated loans. From November 2006 through August 2007, Mozilo exercised more than 5.1 million stock options and sold the underlying shares for total proceeds of nearly $140 million, pursuant to written trading plans adopted in late 2006 and early 2007.

The SEC's complaint alleges that each of the defendants violated Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, and aided and abetted violations of Sections 13(a) of the Exchange Act and Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, and 13a-13 thereunder. The complaint further alleges that Mozilo and Sieracki violated Rule 13a-14 under the Exchange Act. The SEC's complaint seeks permanent injunctive relief, officer and director bars, and financial penalties against all of the defendants and the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains with prejudgment interest against Mozilo and Sambol.

****

Excerpts of E-Mails From Angelo Mozilo

Sept. 26, 2006 — following up a meeting with Sambol the previous day about the Pay-Option ARM loan portfolio:

We have no way, with any reasonable certainty, to assess the real risk of holding these loans on our balance sheet. The only history we can look to is that of World Savings however their portfolio was fundamentally different than ours in that their focus was equity and our focus is fico. In my judgement [sic], as a long time lender, I would always trade off fico for equity. The bottom line is that we are flying blind on how these loans will perform in a stressed environment of higher unemployment, reduced values and slowing home sales.

…

… pay options are currently mispriced in the secondary market, and that spread could disappear quickly if there is an foreseen [sic] headline event such as another lender getting into deep trouble with this product or because of negative investor occurance [sic].

…

"timing is right" … to … "sell all newly originated pay options and begin rolling off the bank balance sheet, in an orderly manner, pay options currently in their port[folio]."

April 17, 2006 — to Sambol concerning Countrywide's subprime 80/20 loans:

In all my years in the business I have never seen a more toxic prduct [sic]. It's not only subordinated to the first, but the first is subprime. In addition, the FICOs are below 600, below 500 and some below 400[.] With real estate values coming down…the product will become increasingly worse. There has [sic] to be major changes in this program, including substantial increases in the minimum FICO. … Whether you consider the business milk or not, I am prepared to go without milk irrespective of the consequences to our production.

April 13, 2006 — to Sambol, Sieracki, and others to address issues relating to the 100 percent subprime second business in light of the losses associated with the HSBC buyback:

Loans had been originated … "through our channels with disregard for process [and] compliance with guidelines."

…

He "personally observed a serious lack of compliance within our origination system as it relates to documentation and generally a deterioration in the quality of loans originated versus the pricing of those loan [sic]."

…

"[i]n my conversations with Sambol he calls the 100% sub prime seconds as the 'milk' of the business. Frankly, I consider that product line to be the poison of ours."

On March 28, 2006 — to Sambol and others:

Directed them to implement a series of corrective measures to "avoid the errors of both judgment and protocol that have led to the issues that we face today caused by the buybacks mandated by HSBC." …

… The 100% loan-to-value subprime product is "the most dangerous product in existence and there can be nothing more toxic and therefore requires that no deviation from guidelines be permitted irrespective of the circumstances."

Source: SEC