Downsized U.S. Goals and Presence in Iraq

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6/9/2008 -- In a new report from The Century Foundation, former National Intelligence Council vice-chair Ellen Laipson argues that the United States needs to move quickly to reset its Iraq policy goals, arguing that U.S. strategic goals in the Middle East region require a change in Iraq policy regardless of how Iraq’s internal political scenario plays out.

“The time for social engineering is over,” Laipson writes in her report, America and the Emerging Iraqi Reality: New Goals, No Illusions, which The Century Foundation released on Monday, June 9. “Events in Iraq will be determined by powerful currents within Iraqi society and politics that are less and less susceptible to outside manipulation or influence.”

According to Laipson’s report, elections in both Iraq and the United States over the next eighteen months could significantly change the landscape for U.S. policy toward Iraq. In the United States, Iraq could well be one of the most important issues on voters’ minds when they make their choice in the presidential contest. The campaigns have raised expectations that major changes may be in the offing, even if the clarity of campaign aspirations may need to bend somewhat to the harsh realities of troop deployments, funding needs, and potential destabilization from changing course too.

Iraqis too will be asked to register their choices in provincial elections in fall 2008 and in national elections in December 2009. A new U.S. administration could find itself dealing with different Iraqi political leaders than those collaborating with President Bush, possibly taking more stringent positions on the U.S. military presence in the country, among other issues.

These political cycles should open the way to new thinking and new approaches, says Laipson, president of the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington. Her report offers ways to retool U.S. policy, at three levels:

•Policy Goals. U.S. policymakers and the larger public policy community need to explore the big questions: What are the real U.S. stakes in Iraq over the next five to ten years? How does U.S. engagement in Iraq affect U.S. ability to achieve other goals in the critical Middle East region and beyond? Given the Bush administration’s failure to achieve goals of Iraq’s “transformation” into a model for the region, what would be desirable and achievable new goals for policy toward Iraq? Why would Washington want or need a “special relationship” with Iraq? Can the United States scale back its stake and its presence in Iraq without generating new mistrust and disorder in the region? Can the United States be more effective in dealing with the challenges of Iran and the Arab-Israeli peace process if it is less preoccupied with Iraq? Laipson’s report offers her own answers.

•The Politics and Perceptions of Policy Change. A new president will need to assert the positive aspects of a new approach, and to manage public perceptions of failure or retreat for U.S. foreign policy. The president will need to deal with Middle Eastern and other international reactions, including possible charges of abandonment and betrayal and contradictory and paradoxical worries about American weakness. This public diplomacy challenge could affect the political atmosphere in the United States and in Iraq. Leaders need to listen carefully to voters’ preferences, and to make hard choices. Over time, public attitudes may rally to new policy approaches that show promise of achieving better outcomes.

•Practical Matters. The Bush administration is currently working with Baghdad on a new strategic framework for the bilateral relationship premised on an important degree of continuity in the relationship. The administration envisions a robust U.S. presence in the country, including base arrangements that are already hotly controversial. It is not clear if the Iraqi parliament will endorse the new framework, much less the U.S. Congress. Yet even if the outgoing administration succeeds in hammering out a deal, such arrangements cannot be permanent and tie the hands of a new administration that wants to steer the relationship in new directions. Facing heavy economic and budgetary strains, the United States needs to review the ongoing costs of U.S. deployments and civilian activities in Iraq. A fresh look at reducing the size of the security presence, the U.S. Embassy compound, and their impacts on Iraqi public opinion is warranted.

In short, writes Laipson, it is time to plan for a transition to a more modest and realistic relationship with Iraq. The United States has important stakes in Iraq, she acknowledges, but Washington needs to shift its focus from trying to be the impresario of Iraq’s reinvention to being a supportive friend of a country passing through a critical and extended transition.

A new administration will need to engage Congress on new approaches that would return to Congress more appropriate oversight of U.S. commitments and programs in Iraq. Some prospective policymakers in Washington will be concerned about a loss of U.S. credibility from scaling back the U.S. presence. Fresh analysis and exposure to Iraqi views will be important in the development of a new American approach, writes Laipson. Should inter-factional fighting worsen in Iraq, for example, some might argue for suspending any drawdown of U.S. forces, but prudent policy should attempt to reduce America’s liability for the ups and downs of political violence in Iraq.

The United Nations can be expected to play a more prominent role, she adds, despite resistance from some member states and career professionals at U.N. headquarters who object to U.N. implementation of a controversial U.S. policy yet fear new chaos in Iraq should the United States pull back too abruptly. The international community may find that a reduced American presence creates a more congenial space in which impartial U.N. representatives can operate. The United States, which has been the catalyst for various meetings of donors and neighbors during the occupation, should provide strong financial and other support for U.N.-led efforts in Iraq, she proposes.

Iraq has warned the United Nations and Washington that it will not ask the Security Council to renew the Chapter VII legal authority for coalition forces to operate in Iraq when it expires at year’s end. This is an important political marker, insists Laipson in her report, because it signals that the United States cannot continue with its current presence and purposes in Iraq, even as the current administration finds it very hard to abandon its established approach. America’s presidential contenders also need to think beyond the rhetorically effective sound bites that distill their goals, even as many Americans clamor for reduced costs and change. “Still, there is a responsible path that allows us to reduce our out-sized presence in Iraq, even as we maintain an appropriate level of engagement with a country which, for better or worse, will be an important player in a critical region for the foreseeable future,” writes Laipson.

Source: Century Foundation


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