Senator Ted Kennedy Questions Navy, Marine Corps On MRAP Urgent Need Acquisition And Service Strain

United States Armed Services Committee Hearing

February 28, 2008 -- (As Prepared for Delivery) -- MRAP Vehicle Issue: According to recent press reports, an internal Marine Corps study found that the General in command of our Marine forces in western Iraq sent an urgent request three years ago this month for over a thousand Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles, called MRAPs. But his urgent request was apparently lost in the bureaucracy and never made it to the senior levels of the Marine Corps.

As we all know, it took the Secretary of Defense’s intervention in 2007 to fix the broken bureaucracy and get a sufficient number of MRAPs to our forces in Iraq. As Secretary Gates said last June, “The way I have put it to everyone is that you have to look outside the normal bureaucratic way of doing things. And so does industry, because lives are at stake. For every month we delay, scores of young Americans are going to die.”

The recent Marine Corps study itself states that “if mass procurement and fielding of MRAPs had begun in 2005 in response to the known threats, as the Marine Corps is doing today, hundreds of deaths and injuries could have been prevented.”

The Marine Corps has questioned the press reports, saying the study was not an official Marine Corps study, and that its conclusions are the investigator’s own. Recently, General Magnus, as Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, stated

“I don’t think the study stands up to the facts about what we did, about what the industry was capable of doing, and why we did what we did. I just don’t think that’s accurate.”

A Naval Audit Service Report last September, however, supported the Marine study and its accusations of inefficiency when it concluded that the Marine Corps had not established adequate oversight for urgent needs of its forces.

Two days ago, the Marine Corps finally began to acknowledge the seriousness of the study’s conclusions and asked the Pentagon’s Inspector General to examine the allegations. It seems, however, that the Marine Corps is still focused on downplaying the issue of getting MRAPs to Iraq, and missing the bigger issue, which is that the Marine Corps bureaucracy is broken.

As the study concluded, “MRAP is just one current example of how a loss of time had direct and measurable consequences on a battlefield…Marine Corps combat development organizations are not optimized to provide responsive, flexible, and relevant solutions to commanders in the field.”

The Naval Audit report last September agreed, stating that the Marine Corps bureaucracy was broken and that the ability to accomplish the mission could be undermined and the delivery of needed equipment delayed.

General Conway, how do you explain the difference between Marine statements that dismiss the MRAP study’s conclusions and the Naval Audit report that the Marine Corps bureaucracy is broken in dealing with urgent requirements?

General Conway, the Naval Audit report’s #1 recommendation is that by April 30, you “promulgate a Marine Corps Order defining the roles, responsibilities, and desired outcomes of the urgent need process.” Where do you stand with promulgating this order, and why does it take so long for the Marine Corps to fix a problem as important as fulfilling urgent needs such as MRAPs?

It seems to me the report has merit, and that its main conclusion about the Marine Corps’ bureaucracy was backed up by the Naval Audit report. The Marine Corps needs to take a hard look at its urgent request process, and you need to act quickly to get this fixed. It’s unacceptable for our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan to wait so long for the system to get fixed. They’ve been waiting for years. We can’t afford to have another case like the MRAP debacle. It shouldn’t take the personal involvement of the Secretary of Defense to fix urgent requirements like MRAP. Can’t we do better?

Strain on the Navy

In recent years, the Navy has significantly increased its Individual Augmentee, or “I-A” program, which was originally championed by then-Chief of Naval Operations and now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen. The program pulls Enlisted Sailors and Officers from their shore commands and ships at sea, and sends them in a support role for the Army and Marine Corps, mostly in Iraq and Afghanistan and other areas of the Middle East.

Comments from senior leaders in the Department of the Navy have all been very positive in the last few years. Admiral Mullen said a year ago that “I see this as a long-term commitment by the Navy. I’m anxious to pitch in as much as we possibly can, for the duration of this war. I fundamentally believe that you can’t stay 1,000 miles out at sea and watch the rest of the world go by.”

There’s no denying the positive impact these sailors have made and continue to make in challenging assignments that are often outside their area of expertise. After only a few weeks of combat skills training with the Army at bases like Fort Jackson in South Carolina, Navy Sailors are picking up rifles and fighting alongside soldiers and Marines who are often on their third, fourth, or even fifth deployment. The Navy sailors arguably gain valuable experience supporting the Army and Marine Corps, which are severely strained by the continuing quagmire in Iraq.

I’m concerned about the long-term effect of this program, and what it says about the current and future readiness of our Navy.

Today, there are 11,981 Navy personnel, both active duty and reserves, on such augmentee assignments around the globe. That’s nearly 2 percent of the active duty Navy and 4.5 percent of the Navy reserves.

All of these personnel are taken from their Navy unit, whether on shore or on ships at sea, with no replacement. On average, this equals about 6 sailors and officers missing from each of our deployable battle force ships, and those ships must still train, operate, and deploy with fewer personnel.

IA Questions

Secretary Winter and Admiral Roughead, I know the positive aspects of this program. I’m interested in the other side of this equation. With almost 12,000 Navy personnel filling these IA positions, have you seen any impact on the current Navy? How do you measure these effects, and how can you reduce the risks, especially for ships operating with 6 fewer personnel because of this program?

Do you have any long-term concerns about what this program will do to current and future readiness of the Navy?

I understand your position on this program, and I appreciate the efforts and sacrifices of the thousands of Navy personnel who are supporting the Army and Marine Corps in Iraq and Afghanistan. But I can’t help but be concerned about the long term effect. These are thousands of sailors and officers trained for the Navy missions that need to be undertaken. Yet we’re taking a year or more out of their Navy experience, including valuable time on ships at sea, and we can never get that back. These are future Commanding Officers of our ships, future senior enlisted leaders. We need to keep close watch on how this program is affecting readiness in the Navy.

Source: Senator Ted Kennedy

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