Senator Feinstein Asks Defense Dept. and Cal Fire To Ensure Swift Deployment of Military Aircraft to Fight Wildfires

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Seeks to determine if red tape slowed response to Southern California wildfires

November 20, 2007 -- Washington, DC – U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) today sent letters to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and California Department of Forestry and Fire Ruben Grijalva, asking them for a full accounting of the deployment of military aircraft to fight the recent wildfires that devastated Southern California.

In her letters, Senator Feinstein asked for a broad range of information, including what military aircraft and personnel could be used to fight fires, nationally and in California; what assets were requested, and when; were requests turned down, and why; and what role, if any, high winds played in delayed deployments.

Senator Feinstein also asked Secretary Gates and Director Grijalva to work together to quickly develop clear, unambiguous guidelines for the use of military aircraft for fire suppression. Her letters came on the heels of reports that bureaucratic red tape may have delayed the deployment of military aircraft to fight the Southern California wildfires.

Following are the texts of the letters sent by Senator Feinstein:

November 20, 2007

The Honorable Robert Gates
Secretary of Defense
1000 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1000

Dear Secretary Gates,

I am writing to you regarding the recent wildfires in Southern California and the Department of Defense’s response to this disaster. Let me begin by expressing my sincere appreciation for the critical assistance and invaluable contributions from the men and women in uniform in responding to the fires. Their dedication, especially in the face of fires threatening Camp Pendleton and their own homes off-base, will not be soon forgotten.

Unfortunately, last month’s fires once again raised questions about whether or not bureaucratic procedures prevented the use of military aircraft to help fight wildfires in San Diego. As you may know, a Blue Ribbon Fire Commission formed by Governor Schwarzenegger after the 2003 fires recommended state and federal agencies “work in conjunction with the military to jointly develop agreements, regulations and operating policies for the employment of aerial assets during WUI [wildland urban interface] firefighting efforts.” Though a November 11, 2005 report updating progress on the Commission’s recommendations stated that task had been completed, confusion and disagreement over what steps are necessary to authorize the use of military assets in firefighting during the recent incident strongly suggests the need to review and clarify these policies.

Beyond the policy matters, a number of basic facts about the use of military aircraft during the fires are also in question. Consequently, I would like to ask you to ascertain the answers to the following questions:

What firefighting assets, both in terms of personnel and equipment, does the DoD possess which could be used to fight wildfires in general and in California in particular? Has the DoD identified additional firefighting personnel and equipment needs?

When will the Air National Guard’s new C-130J’s and Modular Airborne Fire Fighting Systems (MAFFS) be available for use and can anything be done to expedite the process? Are military aircraft communication systems compatible with local, state and federal firefighting aircraft radio systems?

What military assets were requested to fight the fires, when, and by whom? Were those requests honored, when, and how were those assets used?

Were military assets requested by fire incident commanders or state or local officials that were not granted? If so, why not? Were there military assets available in Southern California that could have been used for firefighting which were not? If so, why not?

What DoD policies and requirements exist regarding the use of military aircraft to fight wildfires on non-military land?

It is my understanding that the Navy has an MOU with the California Department of Forestry and Fire (CAL FIRE) regarding training for and use of military aircraft to fight wildfires. What are the basic terms of the agreement and does a similar agreement exist with the Marines or the DoD overall? Is an MOU necessary or at least advisable in order to prevent confusion during potential future disasters?

Does the DoD, Navy or Marines require CAL FIRE personnel or “spotters” to be on board military aircraft in order for those assets to be used in off-base firefighting or do you have any agreements with CAL FIRE or other agencies that require that? Were any ad hoc agreements put in place during the fires that allowed for a waiver of this policy and will those agreements now serve as standard procedure in the future?

What is the process and decision making chain of command involved in making military assets available for aiding in Southern California wildland firefighting?

What role did weather conditions, namely wind, play in any decisions to use or not to use military aircraft?

How would you recommend streamlining the process to allow for more direct coordination between incident commanders and local military base commanders regarding the use of military assets?

Given the ongoing wildfire threat in Southern California, I believe it is important for the DoD and local, state and federal firefighting officials to work together to develop clear, unambiguous guidelines for the use of military aircraft for fire suppression as soon as possible. My hope is that by establishing a common set of facts and by clarifying existing policies, all parties will be able to quickly identify the improvements necessary for better cooperation to combat fires in the future.

Again, I want to commend the tremendous effort and support provided by the military in responding to the wildfires in Southern California. I look forward to working with you on the issues raised in my letter.

Sincerely,

Dianne Feinstein
United States Senator

November 20, 2007

Chief Ruben Grijalva
Director
California Department of Forestry and Fire
1416 9th Street
Sacramento, California 94244-2460

Dear Chief Grijalva,

I am writing to you regarding the recent wildfires in Southern California and the ongoing debate over the military aircraft to aid the California Department of Forestry and Fire’s firefighting. Despite the heroic efforts of CAL FIRE firefighters to save lives and property, last month’s fires once again raised questions about whether or not bureaucratic procedures prevented the use of military aircraft to help fight wildfires in San Diego.

As you may know, a Blue Ribbon Fire Commission formed by Governor Schwarzenegger after the 2003 fires recommended state and federal agencies “work in conjunction with the military to jointly develop agreements, regulations and operating policies for the employment of aerial assets during WUI [wildland urban interface] firefighting efforts.” Though a November 11, 2005 report updating progress on the Commission’s recommendations stated that task had been completed, confusion and disagreement over what steps are necessary to authorize the use of military assets in firefighting during the recent incident strongly suggests the need to review and clarify these policies.

Beyond the policy matters, a number of basic facts about the use of military aircraft during the fires are also in question. Consequently, I would like to ask you to ascertain the answers to the following questions:

What military assets were requested to fight the fires, when, and by whom? Were those requests honored, when, and how were those assets used?

Were military assets requested by fire incident commanders that were not granted? If so, why not? Were there military assets available in Southern California that could have been used for firefighting which were not? If so, why not?

What is the process and decision making chain of command involved in requesting military assets for firefighting?

What CAL FIRE policies and requirements exist regarding the use of military aircraft to fight wildfires on non-military land?

Does CAL FIRE require its personnel or “spotters” to be on board military aircraft in order for those assets to be used in off-base firefighting? Were any ad hoc agreements put in place during the fires that allowed for a waiver of this policy and will those agreements now serve as standard procedure in the future?

It is my understanding that CAL FIRE has a MOU with the Navy regarding training for and use of military aircraft to fight wildfires. What are the basic terms of the agreement and does a similar agreement exist with the Marines or the Department of Defense overall? Is an MOU necessary or at least advisable in order to prevent confusion during potential future disasters?

Are you aware of any equipment compatibility problems between military and non-military firefighting aircraft and communication systems? If so, how did those problems factor into the decisions regarding the use of military aircraft?

What role did weather conditions, namely wind, play in any decisions to use or not to use military aircraft?

How would you recommend streamlining the process to allow for more direct coordination between incident commanders and local military base commanders regarding the use of military assets?

Given the ongoing wildfire threat in Southern California, I believe it is important for CAL FIRE and the DoD to work together to develop clear, unambiguous guidelines for the use of military aircraft for fire suppression as soon as possible. My hope is that by establishing a common set of facts and by clarifying existing policies, all parties will be able to quickly identify the improvements necessary for better cooperation to combat fires in the future.

Again, I want to commend CAL FIRE on its tremendous response to the wildfires in Southern California. I look forward to working with you on the issues raised in my letter.

Sincerely,

Dianne Feinstein
United States Senator

Source: Senator Dianne Feinstein


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